Tara Scott et al., Order on Plaintiffs\u27 Motion to Dismiss Counterclaims by Long, Elizabeth E.
Georgia State University College of Law
Reading Room
Georgia Business Court Opinions
11-9-2018
Tara Scott et al., Order on Plaintiffs' Motion to
Dismiss Counterclaims
Elizabeth E. Long
Fulton County Superior Court
Follow this and additional works at: https://readingroom.law.gsu.edu/businesscourt
Part of the Business Law, Public Responsibility, and Ethics Commons, Business Organizations
Law Commons, and the Contracts Commons
This Court Order is brought to you for free and open access by Reading Room. It has been accepted for inclusion in Georgia Business Court Opinions
by an authorized administrator of Reading Room. For more information, please contact mbutler@gsu.edu.
Institutional Repository Citation
Long, Elizabeth E., "Tara Scott et al., Order on Plaintiffs' Motion to Dismiss Counterclaims" (2018). Georgia Business Court Opinions.
450.
https://readingroom.law.gsu.edu/businesscourt/450
IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF FULTON COUNTY 
BUSINESS CASE DIVISION 
ST ATE OF GEORGIA 
TARA SCOTT; BAILEY M. CARTER; and ) 
WILSON CARTER. Individually, as Trustee ) 
of THE WILSON M. CARTER 1988 ) 
TRUST, and as Next Friend of MARY ) 






JOHN J. CARR and ) 




File No. 2017CV297083 
Bus. Case Div. 2 
ORDER ON PLAINTIFFS' MOTION TO DISMISS COUNTERCLAIMS 
The above styled matter is before the Court on Plaintiffs' Motion to Dismiss Defendant 
John J. Carr's Counterclaims ("Motion to Dismiss"). Having considered the pleadings, the Court 
finds as follows: 
SUMMARY OF RELEVANT PLEADINGS 
In this action Plaintiffs allege Defendants John J. Carr and John Matthew Dwyer violated 
state and federal securities laws and conunitted other torts when they solicited and sold Plaintiffs 
shares in Vantage Corporation ("Vru1tage"). Plaintiffs assert that at the time they were sold the 
Vantage shares: the stock was not a federal covered security, was not subject to an effective 
registration statement and was not exempt from registration; Defendants received direct or 
indirect compensation for their role in soliciting investments in Vantage but were not registered 
as securities salespeople or as investment advisors; and Defendants made misleading statements 
of material fact or omissions when soliciting and selling shares to Plaintiffs causing Plaintiffs to 
suffer damages. 
In his answer to Plaintiffs' Second Amended Complaint, filed Aug. 13, 2018, Defendant 
Carr asserts a counterclaim against Plaintiffs Tara Scott and Wilson Carter that includes claims 
for breach of contract and breach of fiduciary duty. The breach of contract claim is specifically 
directed against Scott. Carr asserts that on Oct. 24, 2016, Scott executed a Stock Transfer, Power 
of Attorney to Transfer Stock and Release Agreement ("Stock Transfer Agreement").' Therein 
Scott assigned and transferred to David F. Lawrence 119.240675 shares of her Vantage stock and 
appointed the President of Vantage to transfer the stock on the company's books. Carr contends 
Scott breached a release provision contained in the Stock Transfer Agreement by filing this 
action against him. 
With respect to the breach of fiduciary duty claim, Carr previously asserted that, to the 
extent the Court finds the parties agreed to be partners, Scott and Carter breached their fiduciary 
duties and implied covenants of good faith, fair dealing, and loyalty by: failing to disclose 
information and not providing accurate information; not acting in Carr and the partnership's best 
interests; making misrepresentations and omissions of facts and events; and misusing superior 
knowledge, among other allegations. However, in his Second Amended Answer to Plaintiffs' 
Second Amended Complaint and Counterclaim, filed on Oct. 29, 2018, Carr abandoned the 
breach of fiduciary duty claim, leaving only the breach of contract claim against Scott. 
Defendant John J. Carr's Second Amended Answer to Plaintiffs' Second Amended Complaint and 
Counterclaim, Ex. K (Stock Transfer Agreement). See Hendon Properties, LLC v. Cinema Dev., LLC, 275 Ga. App. 
434. 435, 620 S.£.2d 644, 647 (2005) ("[A] trial court may properly consider exhibits attached to and incorporated 
in the pleadings in considering a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim for relief') (citing Bakhtiarnejad v. 
Cox Enterprises. 247 Ga. App. 205, 208(1). 541 S.E.2d 33 (2000)). 
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ANALYSIS 
I. Standard on a Motion to Dismiss 
A motion to dismiss brought under O.C.G.A. §9-l l-12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim 
upon which relief may be granted should not be sustained unless: 
(1) the allegations of the complaint disclose with certainty that the 
claimant would not be entitled to relief under any state of provable 
facts asserted in support thereof; and (2) the movant establishes that 
the claimant could not possibly introduce evidence within the 
framework of the complaint sufficient to wan-ant a grant of the 
relief sought. .. 
Austin v. Clark, 294 Ga. 773, 774-75, 755 S.E.2d 796, 798-99 (2014) (citing Anderson v. Flake, 
267 Ga. 498, 501(2). 480 S.E.2d 10 (1997)); Abramyan v. State, 301 Ga. 308. 309, 800 S.E.2d 
366, 368 (2017), reconsideration denied (June 5, 2017). "When the sufficiency of the complaint 
is questioned by a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim for which relief may be granted, 
the rules require that it be construed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff with all doubts 
resolved in his favor even though unfavorable constructions are possible." Cobb Cty. v. Jones 
Grp. P.L.C., 218 Ga. App. 149,152,460 S.E.2d 516,520 (1995) (citing Time Ins. Co. v. Fulton- 
DeKalb Hosp. Auth., 211 Ga. App. 34, 35,438 S.E.2d 149 (1993)). 
II. Analysis and Conclusions of Law 
A. Breach of Contract Claim 
ln his counterclaim Carr alleges Scott breached the Stock Transfer Agreement by filing 
this action against him in violation of the release contained in the agreement. Plaintiffs urge Carr 
fails to state a claim for breach of contract because the Stock Transfer Agreement only 
concerned the 119.240675 Vantage shares she transferred thereunder, not the remaining shares of 
Vantage stock she continues to own and which are the subject of her clai.ms in this action and, iJ1 
particular, her prayer for rescission. 
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In Georgia, 
[a] release or settlement agreement is a contract subject to construction by 
the court. It is governed by state law applicable to contracts in general. 
The cardinal rule of construction is to determine the intention of the 
parties. Where the terms of a written contract are clear and unambiguous, 
the court will look to the contract alone to find the intention of the parties. 
Such a contract is the only evidence of what the parties intended and 
understood by it. 
Tisdale v. Westmoore Grp., LLC, 341 Ga. App. 445, 448, 800 S.E.2d 624, 627-28 (2017) 
(quoting Unffund Financial Corp. v. Donaghue, 288 Ga. App. 81, 82, 653 S.E.2d 5 I 3 (2007). 
See also Kinard v. Worldcom. Jnc., 232 Ga. App. 278, 279, 500 S.E.2d 649, 650 (1998) (''It is 
well established that where the terms of a written release are clear and unambiguous, the court 
wi 11 look to the release alone to find the intention of the parties"). "The fact that the scope of the 
[release] is broad does not make [it] ambiguous." Rice v. Huft~ 221 Ga. App. 592, 593, 472 
S.E.2d 140,142 (]996) (citing Citadel Corp. v. Sun Chem. Corp .. 212 Ga. App. 875, 876(2), 443 
S.E.2d 489 (1994)). 
Here, the Stock Transfer Agreement identifies and defines the subject "Shares" as 
119.240675 shares of the Class_ Common Stock, $.0001 par value, of Vantage Corporation 
standing in Transferor Tara M. Scott's name on Vantage's books represented by Certificate No. 
A-0020.2 The Stock Transfer Agreement includes a release that provides in part: 
For and in consideration of the promises, covenants, and warranties 
contained herein ... [Tara M. Scott] does hereby release, rernise, acquit and 
forever discharge (Vantage Corporation] and each of [Vantage 
Corporationj's successors, assigns, affiliates, and their respective past 
and present officers, directors, agents, servants, employees, and attorneys 
(the "Releasees"), from any and all rights, demands, claims, damages, 
losses, costs, expenses, actions and causes of action whatsoever, including 
but not limited to claims arising under the Shares, including claims in 
tort or in contract, at law or in equity, known or unknown, contingent or 
fixed, suspected or unsuspected. [Tara M. Scott] understands and agrees 
that by signing this agreement [she] is giving up rights, if any, which 
2 
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[size] may have under federal, state, or municipal law, and is hereby 
covenanting not to file complaints or lawsuits or to assert any claims 
against Releasees arising thereunder. 
(Emphasis added). 
The Court finds the Stock Transfer Agreement did not simply release claims related to 
the transferred Shares as asserted by Plaintiffs. Notably, the release language does not contain 
any limitations narrowing the scope or the specific types of claims being released. Rather, Scott 
released "any and all" rights, claims, actions, and causes of action, including "but not limited to" 
the transferred Shares. Given this broad but unambiguous language, Carr has at least stated a 
claim for breach of Stock Transfer Agreement. Thus, Plaintiffs' Motion to Dismiss Carr's breach 
of contract counterclaim is hereby DENIED. 
B. Attorney's Fees and Litigation Expenses Related to Breach of Contract Claim 
Plaintiffs also urge that Carr fails to state a claim for attorney's fees and expenses of 
litigation with respect to the breach of contract counterclaim because the Stock Transfer 
Agreement does not include any provision for the recovery of such fees and Carr has not 
specially pied the statutory grounds for the recovery of attorney's fees and expenses under 
O.C.G.A. § 13-6-11. In response, Carr acknowledges there is no Georgia authority specifically 
holding that attorney's fees and litigation expenses are necessarily recoverable as damages for 
breach of a release agreement and notes the split in authority among other jurisdictions on this 
issue. See Sun Life Assurance Co. of Canada v. Imperial Premium Fin .. LLC, 904 F.3d 1197, 
1225 (11th Cir. 2018) ("In at least some jurisdictions, an action filed in violation of a contract 
not to sue may under certain circumstances-which vary by jurisdiction-permit a suit for 
breach, with the measure of damages usually being the attorney's fees and costs incurred in 
defending against the claim that was precluded"; collecting cases from jurisdictions that allow 
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such claims and others that "take a different approach"). However, Carr argues Scott's breach of 
the Stock Transfer Agreement has caused him to incur attorney's fees and litigation expenses in 
defense thereof and, thus are "part and parcel" of the damages required to compensate him for 
Scott's breach of the agreement. The Court is not persuaded. 
"The general rule in our legal system is that 'parties are responsible for their own 
attorney fees and that an award of fees is an exception to this rule." Pipe Sols., Inc. v. Inglis, 291 
Ga. App. 328, 329, 661 S.E.2d 683, 685 (2008) (citing Dept. of Transp. v. Ga. Television 
Co., 244 Ga. App. 750, 753(1) 536 S.E.2d 773 (2000)). Indeed under Georgia law "[t)he 
expenses of litigation generally shall not be allowed as a part of the damages" in a lawsuit. 
O.C.G.A. § I 3-6-1 I ( emphasis added). Thus, it is well settled that '·[i)n Georgia, 'attorney fees 
are not generally recoverable as damages absent an express provision in a contract or a statutory 
mandate."' Doss & Assocs. v. First Am. Title Ins. Co., 325 Ga. App. 448, 464, 754 S.E.2d 85, 98 
(2013) (quoting George L. Smith. etc. v. Miller Brewing Co .. 255 Ga. App. 643. 644, 566 S.E.2d 
361 (2002)) (emphasis in original). See Georgia Subsequent Injury Tr. Fund v. Muscogee Iron 
Works, 265 Ga. 790,790,462 S.E.2d 367,368 (1995); Money v. Thompson & Green Mach. Co., 
155 Ga. App. 566, 566, 271 S.E.2d 699, 700 (1980); Bowers v. Fulton Ctv., 227 Ga. 814,815, 
183 S.E.2d 347, 347-48 (1971); Bankers Fid. Life ins. Co. v. Oliver, 106 Ga. App. 305,307, 126 
S.E.2d 887,890 (1962). See also 
Given the above binding authorities. insofar as the Stock Transfer Agreement does not 
contain any provision expressly authorizing the recovery of attorney's fees and litigation 
expenses for breach of the agreement, and whereas Carr has not pied any statutory basis or other 
binding legal authority which would permit the recovery of same, any claim for such fees and 
expenses as a measure of Carr s damages is hereby DISMISSED. 
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C. Breach of Fiduciary Duty 
Insofar as Carr amended his counterclaim to withdraw the cause of action against Scott 
and Carter for breach of fiduciary duty, Plaintiffs' Motion to Dismiss that claim is hereby 
DENIED as moot. 
III. Conclusion 
Plaintiffs' Motion to Dismiss Defendant John J. Carr's Counterclaims 1s hereby 
GRANTED in part and DENIED in part as set forth above. 
~ 
SO ORDERED this 9 day of November, 2018. 
-I E. LONG, ·SENI 
Fulton Cou ty Superior Court 
Business Case Division 
Atlanta Judicial Circuit 
DGE 
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Served upon registered service contact through eFileGA: 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs ~' Attorneys for Defendants 
S. Lawrence Polk 
EVERSHEDSSUTHERLAND(US)LLP 
999 .Peachtree Street, NE 
Suite 2300 
Atlanta, Georgia 30309-3996 
Tel: (404) 853-8000 
Fax: (404) 853-8806 
I arrypo I k@,evcrsheds-sut her land .com 
David M. Mondc 
Michael J. McConnell 
Janine Cone Metcalf 
Kaelcy R. Brown 
JONES DAY 
1420 Peachtree Street, N.E. 
Suite 800 
Atlanta, Georgia 30309-3053 
Tel: (404) 581-3939 
Fax: ( 404) 581-8330 
dmmonde(@jonesday.com 
mm econ nel l@.j onesday .com 
jmetcalf@jonesdav.com 
krbrown(@.jonesdav.com 
Counsel for Defendant John J Carr 
James D. Blitch IV 
BLITCH LAW, P.C. 
191 Peachtree Street. NE 
Suite 3285 
Atlanta, Georgia 30303-1740 
Tel: (404) 221-0401 
fax: (404) 221-0402 
jim@bl itch law.com 
Counselfor Defendant Matthew Dwyer, fl! 
8 
